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ABSTRAcT
Persistent budget deficits have increased economists' interest in
theories and evidence about fiscal policy. This paper develops the Ricardian
approach and contrasts it with standard models. The discussion considers
from major theoretical objections to Iticardian equivalence—finite lifetimes,
imperfect capital markets, uncertainty about future taxes and incomes, and
the distorting effects of taxation Then the paper considers empirical
evidence on interest rates, consumption and saving, and current-account
deficits. The conclusion is that the Ricardian approach is a usefnl
first-order approximation, and that this approach will probably become the




Cambridge. MA 02138In recent years there has been a lot of discussion about U.S. budget
deficits. Many economists and other observers have viewed these deficits as
harmful to the U.S. and world economies. The supposed harmful effects,
predicted by theories of the life-cycle type, include high real interest
rates, low saving, low rates of economic growth, large current-account
deficits in the United States and other countries with large budget deficits,
and either a high or low dollar (depending apparently on the time period).
On the other hand, this crisis scenario has been hard to maintain along with
the robust performance of the U.S. economy since late 1982. This performance
features high average growth rates of real GNP, declining unemployment, much
lower inflation than before, a sharp decrease in nominal interest rates and
some decline in expected real interest rates, high values of real investment
expenditures, and (until October 1987) a dramatic boom in the stock market.
Persistent budget deficits have increased economists' interest in
theories and evidence about fiscal policy. At the same time, the conflict
between standard predictions and actual outcomes in the U.S. economy has, I
think, increased economists' willingness to consider approaches that depart
from the standard paradigm. In this paper I will focus on the alternative
theory that is associated with the name of David Iticardo.
1. The Standard Model of Bud2et Deficits
Before developing the Ricardian approach, I will sketch the standard
model. The starting point is the assumption that the substitution of a4
thepath of government expenditures and non-tax revenues, a cut in today!s
taxes must be matched by a corresponding increase in the present value of
future taxes.1
Suppose now that households' demands for goods depend on the expected
present value of taxes—that is, each household subtracts its share of this
present value from the expected present value of income to determine a net
wealth position. Then fiscal policy would affect aggregate consumer demand
only if it altered the expected present value of taxes. But the preceding
argument was that the present value of taxes would not change as long as the
present value of spending did not change. Therefore, the substitution of a
budget deficit for current taxes (or any other rearrangement of the timing of
taxes) has no imparct on the aggregate demand for goods. In this sense,
budget deficits and taxation have equivalent effects on the economy—hence,
the term, "Ricardian equivalence theorem."2 To put the equivalence result
another way, a decrease in the government's saving (that is, a current budget
deficit) leads to an offsetting increase in desired private saving, and hence
to no change in desired national saving.
Since desired national saving does not change, the real interest rate
does not have to rise in a closed economy to maintain balance between desired
national saving and investment demand. Hence, there is no effect on
investment, and no burden of the public debt or social security in the sense
of Modigliani (1961) and Feldstein (1974). In a setting of an open economy
there would also be no effect on the current-account balance because desired
private saving rises by enough to avoid having to borrow from abroad.
Therefore, budget deficits would not cause current-account deficits.5
.3.Theoretical Objections to Ricardian Equivalence
I shall discuss four major theoretical objections that have been raised
against the Ricardian conclusions. The first is that people do not live
forever, and hence do not care about taxes that are levied after their death.
The second is that private capital markets are "imperfect," with the typical
person's real discount rate exceeding that of the government. The third is
that future taxes and incomes are uncertain. The fourth is that taxes are
not lump sum, since they depend typically on income, spending, wealth, and so
on. I assume troughont that the path of government spending is given. The
Ricardian analysis applies to shifts in budget deficits and taxes for a given
pattern of government expenditures; in particular, the approach is consistent
with real effects from changes in the level or timing of government purchases
and public services.
It turns out that each of the four issues implies that budget deficits
matter, and are in that sense non-Ricardian. It is important, however, to
consider not only whether the Ricardian view remains intact, but also what
alternative conclnsions emerge. Many economists raise points that invalidate
strict Ricardian equivalence, and then simply assume that the points support
a specific alternative; usually the standard view that a budget deficit
lowers desired national saving and thereby drives up real interest rates or
leads to a current-account deficit. Many criticisms of the Ricardian
position are also inconsistent with this standard view.A. Finite Horizons and Related Issues
The idea of finite horizons, motivated by the finiteness of lif, is
central to life-cyclemodels—see, for example, Franco Modigliani and Richard
Brumherg (1954) and Albert Ando and Franco Modigliani (1963). In these
models individuals capitalize only the taxes that they expect to face before
dying. Consider a deficit-financed tax cut, and assume that the higher
future taxes occur partly during the typical person's expected lifetime and
partly thpreafter. Then the present value of the first portion must fall
short of the initial tax cut, since a full balance results only if the second
portion is included. Hence the net wealth of persons currently alive rises,
and households react by increasing consumption demand. The rise in consumer
demand means that desired private saving does not rise by enough to offset
fully the decline in government saving; hence desired national saving falls.
It follows in a closed economy that the current real interest rate increases:
thereby investment demand falls in the short run and the stock of capital
declines in the long run. For an open economy, the short-run response is a
current-account deficit, which leads in the long run to a smaller stock of
national wealth.
A finite horizon seems to generate the standard result that a budget
deficit reduces desired national saving. The argument works, however, only
if the typical person feels better off when the government shifts a tax
burden to his or her descendants. The argument fails if the typical person
is already giving to his or her children out of altruism. In this case
people react to the government's imposed intergenerational transfers, whichare implied by budget deficits or social security, with a compnsating
increase in voluntary transfers (see Robert Barro, 1974) .Forexample,
parents adjust their bequests or the amounts given to children while the
parents are still living (or, equivalently, children rise their transfers to
aged parents).
The main point is that a network of intergenerational transfers makes the
typical person a part of an extended family that goes on indefinitely. In
this setting, nouseholds capitalize the entire array of expected future
taxes, and thereby plan effectively with an infinite horizon. In other
words, the Ricardian results, which seemed to depend on infinite horizons,
can remain valid in a model with finite lifetimes.
Two important points should be stressed. First, intergenerational
transfers do not have to be "large"; what is necessary is that transfers
based on altruism be operative at the margin for most people.3 Specifically.
most people must be away from the corner solution of zero transfers, where
they would, if permitted, opt for negative payments to their children.
(However, the results also go throngh if children typically support their
aged parents.) Second, the transfers do not have to show up as bequests at
death. Other forms of intergenerational transfers work in a similar manner.
One objection to Ricardian equivalence is that some persons, such as
those without children, are not connected to future generations (see James
Tobin and Willem Buiter, 1980, pp. 86ff.). Persons in this situation tend to
be made wealthier when the government substitutes a budget deficit for taxes.
At least this conclusion obtains to the extent that the interest andS
principal payments on the extra public debt are not financed by higher taxes
during the remaining lifetimes of people currently alive. However, the
quantitative effects on consumption tend to be small. For example, for
someone with 30 years of remaining life who consumes at a constant rate, a
one-time budget deficit of 81 would increase real consumption demand by 1.4
cents per year if the annual real interest rate is 5%, and by 2.1 cents per
year if the real interest rate is 3%•4
The aggregate effect from the existence of childless persons is even
smaller because people with more than the average number of descendants
experience a decrease in wealth when taxes are replaced by budget deficits.
(In effect, although some people have no children, all children must have
parents.) The presumption for a net effect on aggregate consumer demand
depends on different propensities to consume out of wealth for people with
and without children. Since the propensity for those without children tends
to be larger (because of the shorter horizon), a positive net effect on
aggregate consumer demand would he predicted. However, the quantitative
effect is likely to be trivial. Making the same assumptions as in the
previous example, a budget deficit of 81 would raise aggregate real
consumption demand by 0.3 cents per year if the real interest rate is 5%, and
by 0.9 cents if the real interest rate is 37..
Michael Darby (1979, Ch. 3) and Laurence Kotlikoff and Lawrence Summers
(1981) calculate that the accumulation of households' assets in the United
States for the purpose of intergenerational transfers is far more important
than that associated with the life cycle. This observation suggests that9
intergenerational transfers would be operative for most people, a conclusion
that supports the Ricardian position.
Douglas Bernheim, Andrei Shleifer and Lawrence Summers (1985) note that
the motivation behind intergenerational transfers matters for the results.
These authors consider the possibility that bequests, instead of being driven
by altruism, are a strategic device whereby parents induce their children to
behave properly. Some imaginative evidence is presented (involving how often
children visit and communicate with their parents) to document the importance
of strategic bequests.
This enforcement theory of giving may have different implications for the
effects of budget deficits and social security. If the government
redistributes income from young to old (by running a deficit or raising
social security benefits), the old have no reason in this model to raise
transfers to offset fully the government's actions. Instead, the old end up
better off at the expense of the young, and aggregate consumer demand rises.
Then, as in the standard approach, real interest rates increase or domestic
residents borrow more from abroad.
One shortcoming of this approach is that it treats the interaction
between parents and children as equivalent to the purchases of services on
markets. In this setting parents would tend to pay wages to children, rather
than using bequests or other forms of intergenerational transfers. These
features—as well as the observation that most parents seem to care about
their children's welfare—can be better explained by introducing altruism
along with a desire to influence children's behavior. In this case Iticardian1.2
corresponding narrowing of the spread between the two discount rates, r and
r. In the aggrege investment may either rise or fall, and the long-term
effect on the capital stock is uncertain. The major change, however, is a
better channeling of resources tn their ultimate uses. Namely the persnns
from group B—who have relatively high values for rates of time preference
and for marginal returns to investment—command a greater share of current
output. In any event the outcomes are non-neutral, and in that sense
non- Ricardian.
The important finding from the inclusion .f imperfect loan markets is
that the governments issue of public debt can amount to a useful form of
financial intermediation. The government induces people with good access to
credit markets (group A) to hold more than their share of the extra public
debt. Those with poor access (group B) hold less than their share, and
thereby effectively receive loans from the first group. This process works
because the government implicitly guarantees the repayment of loans through
its tax collections and debt payments. Thus loans between A and B take place
even though such loans were not viable (because of "transaction costs") on
the imperfect private credit market.
This much of the argument may be valid, although it credits the
government with a lot of skill in the collection of taxes from people with
poor collateral (which is the underlying source of the problem for private
lenders). Even if the government possesses this skill, the conclusions do
not resemble those from the standard analysis. As discussed before, budget
deficits can amount to more financial intermediation, and are in that sense13
equivalent to a technological advance that improves thefunctioning of loan
markets. From this perspective it is reasonable to finda reduced spread
betveen various discount rates andanimprovement in the allocation of
resources. If the government really is better at theprocess of
intermediating, then more of this activity—that is, more publicdebt—raises
perceived wealth because it actually improves theworkings of the economy.
Instead of introducing costs of enforcing the collection ofloans,
Toshilci Yotsuzuka (1987) extends the analysis ofMervyn King (1984) and Fumio
Ilayashi (1985) by allowing for adverse selectionamong borrowers with
different risk characteristics. Individuals know theirprobabilities of
default, but the lenders' only possibility for learning theseprobabilities
comes from observing the chosen levels of borrowing atgoing interest rates.
In this setting the government's borrowingamounts to a loan to a group that
-
poolsthe various risk classes. Such borrowing matters if theprivate
equilibrium does not involve similar pooling. However,by considering the
incentives of lenders to exchange or not exchange information abouttheir
customers, Yotsuzuka argues that the private equilibrium typically involves,a
pooled loan of limited quantity at a relatively low interestrate. Then the
high-risk types way borrow additional amounts at a high interestrate. In
this case the government's borrowing replaces theprivate pooled lending, and
leads to no real effects-. That is, Ricardian equivalenceholds despite the
imperfect private loan market where high-risk people face
high marginal
borrowing rates. The general lesson again is that Iticardian equivalence
falls because of imperfect credit markets only if thegovernment does things14
in the loan market that are different from, and perhapsbetter than, those
carried out privately.
C.tJncertaintv about Future Taxes and Iocn!!
Some economists argue that the uncertainty aboutindividuals future
taxes—or the complexity in estimating
them—implies a high rate of discount
in capitalizing these future liabilities (seeMartin Bailey, 1971, pp.
157- 58; James Buchanan and Richard Wagner, 1977, pp.17, 101, 130; and Martin
Feldstein, 1976, p.335). In this case, asubstitution of a budget deficit
for current taxes raises net wealth becausethe present value of the higher
expected future taxes falls short ofthe current tax cut. It then follows
that budget deficits raise aggregate consumer
demand and lower desired
national saving.
A proper treatment of uncertainty leads todifferent conclusions. Louis
Chan (1983) first considers the case of lump-sum
taxes that have a known
distribution across households. However, the aggregate
of future taxes and
the real value of future payments on public
debt are subject to uncertainty.
In this case a deficit-financed tax cuthas no real effects. Individuals
hold their share of the extra debt becausethe debt is a perfect hedge
against the uncertainty of the future taxes.(This analysis assumes that
private credit markets have no'imperfections" of the sort discussed
earlier.)
Suppose now that future taxes arestill lump sum but have mit uncertain
incidence across individuals. Furthermore, assume
that there are no15
insurancemarkets for relative tax risks. Them a budget deficit tends to
increase the uncertainty about each individual's future disposable income.
Chan (1983, p. 363) shows for the "usual case" (of non-increasing absolute
risk aversion) that people react by reducing current consumption and hence,
by raising current private saving by store than the tax cut. Consequently,
the effects on real interest rates, investment, the current account, and so
on are the opposites of the standard ones.
The results are different for an income tax (Chan, 1983, pp. 364-366, and
Robert Barsky, Gregory Mankiw and Stephen Zeldes, 1986) .Supposethat each
person pays the tax ry1, where is the person's uncertain future income.
Suppose that there are no insurance markets for individual income risks, and
that r is known. (The analysis thus abstracts from uncertainties in relative
tax rates across individuals.) In this case a budget deficit raises the
future value of r and thereby reduces the uncertainty about each individual's
future disposable income. In effect, the government shares the risks about
individual disposable income to a greater extent. It follows that the
results are opposite to those found before; namely, a budget deficit tends to
raise current consumption and hence, to raise private saving by less than the
tax cut.
Overall, the conclusions depend on the net effect of higher mean future
tax collections on the mncertainty associated with individuals' future
disposable incomes. Desired national saving tends to rise with a budget
deficit if this uncertainty increases, and vice versa.16
9.Thejjtn of Taxes
Departures from Ricardian equivalence arise also if taxes are nOt lump
sum; for example, with an income tax. In this situation budget deficits
change the timing of income taxes, and thereby affect peoplets incentives to
work and produce in different periods. It follows that variations in
deficits are non-neutral, although the results tend also to be inconsistent
with the standard view.
Suppose, for example, that the current income-tax rate, i-1,declines,and
the expected rate for the next period, r2, rises- To simplify matters,
assume that todayrs budget deficit is matched by enough of a surplus next
period so that the public debt does not change in later periods. Because the
tax rate applies to income, people are motivated to work and produce more
thanusual in period I andless than usual in period 2. Since the tax rate
-
doesnot apply to expenditures (and since wealth effects are negligible
here) ,itfollows that desired national saving rises in period 1 and falls in
period 2. Therefore, in a closed economy, after-tax real interest rates tend
to be relatively low in period 1—along with the budget deficit—and
relatively high in period 2—along with the surplus. In an open economy, a
current-account surplus accompanies the budget deficit, and viceversa.5
Hence the results are uoa-Ricardian, but also counter to the standard view.
(Temporary variations in consumption taxes tend to generate the standard
pattern where real interest rates, current-account deficits, and budget
deficits are positively correlated.)
Unlike in the Ricardian case where debt and deficits do not matter, it is
possible in a world of distorting taxes to determine the optimal path of the17
budgetdeficit, which corresponds to the optimal time pattern of taxes. In
effect, the theory of debt management becomes a branch of puhlic finance;
specifically, an application of the theory of optimal taxation;
One result is that budget deficits can be used to
time, despite fluctuations in government expenditures
example, if time periods are identical except for the
smooth tax rates over
and the tax base. For
quantity of government
with labor supply purchases—which are assumed not to interact directly
decisions—then optimality dictates uniform taxation of labor income over
time. This constancy of tax rates requires budget deficits when government
spending is unusually high, such as in wartime, and surpluses when spending
is unusually low.
Constant tax rates over time will not be optimal in general;6 for
example, optimal tax rates on labor income may vary over the business cycle.
To the extent that some smoothing is called for, budget deficits would occur
in recessions, and surpluses in booms. If optimal tax rates are lower than
normal in recessions and higher than normal in booms, the countercyclical
pattern of budget deficits is even more vigorous. The well-known concept of
the full-employment deficit, as discussed in E. Cary Brown (1956) and Council
of Economic Advisers (1962, pp. 78-82), adjusts for this cyclical behavior of
budget deficits.
The tax-smoothing view has implications for the interaction between
inflation and budget deficits if the public debt is denominated in nominal
terms. Basically, the fiscal authority's objective involves the path of tax
rates and other real variables. Therefore, other things equal, a higher rate15
ofexpected inflation (presumably reflecting a higher rate of monetary
growth) motivates a correspondingly higher growth rate of the nominal,
interest-bearing debt. This response keeps the planned path of the real
public debt invariant with expected inflation. This behavior means that
differences in expected rates of inflation can account for substantial
variations in budget deficits if deficits are measured in the conventional
way to correspond to the change in the government's nominal liabilities.
However, this element is less important for an inflation-adjusted budget
deficit, which corresponds to the change in the government's real obligations
(see Jeremy Siegel, 1979).
With perfect foresight, the strict tax-smoothing model implies constant
tax rates. More realistically, new information about the path of governmeut
spending, national income, and so on, would lead to revisions of tax rates.
ifowever, the sign of these revisions would not be predictable. Thus, in the
presence of uncertainty, tax smoothing implies that tax rates would behave
roughly like random walks.
It is possible to use the tax-smoothing approach as a positive theory of
how the government operates, rather than as a normative model of how it
should act.7 Barro (1979, 1986) shows that this framework explains much of
the behavior of U.S. federal deficits from 1916 to 1983, although the
deficits since 1984 turn out to be substantially higher than predicted. Over
the full sample, the major departures from the theory are an excessive
reaction of budget deficits to the business cycle (so that tax rates fall
below 'normal1' during recessions) and an insufficient reaction to temporary19
military spending (so that tax rates rise above normal during wars). These
departures are found also by Chaipat Sahasakul (1986), who looks directly at
the behavior of average marginal tax rates. Barro (1987, Section 3) finds
for the British data from the early 1700s through 1918 that temporary
military spending is the major determinant of budget deficits. Also, unlike
the U.S. case, the results indicate a one-to-one response of budget deficits
to temporary spending.
Gregory Mankiw (1987) used the tax- smoothing model for a joint analysis
of the inflation tax and other taxes. This perspective can explain why
short-term nominal interest rates, which are the tax rate associated with
money, have been close to a random walk since the founding of the Federal
Reserve System in 1914 (see N. Gregory Mankiw and Jeffrey Miron, 1986).
Moreover, Mankiw (1987) finds for the Utiited States from 1952 to 1985 that
changes in nominal interest rates are positively associated with changes in
the ratio of federal tax receipts to GNP or with changes in average marginal
tax rates. These results accord with a model where nominal interest rates
and other tax rates are jointly determined from an optimal-tax perspective.
4. Empirical Evidence on the Econoj.Effects of Budçet Deficits
It is easy on theoretical grounds to raise points that invalidate strict
Ricardian equivalence. Nevertheless, it may still be that the Ricardian view
provides a useful framework for assessing the first-order effects of fiscal
policy. Furthermore, it is unclear theoretically that the standard analysis
offers a more accurate guide. For these reasons it is especially important
to examine empirical evidence.20
The Ricardian and standard views have different predictions about the
effects of fiscal policy on a number of economic variables. The next two
sections summarize the empirical evidence on interest rates and saving.
Although these variables have received considerable attention, the theories
also have divergent implications for other variables, sorb as the
current-account balance and exchange rates. However, because less empirical
work has been done, even less is known about these variables than about
interest rates and saving.
A. Interest Rates
The Ricardian view predicts no effect of budget deficits on real interest
rates, whereas the standard view predicts a positive effect, at least in the
context of a closed economy. (any economists have tested these propositions -
empirically(for a summary, see U.S. Treasury Department, 1984). Typical
results show little relationship between budget deficits and interest rates.
For example, Charles Plosser (1982, p. 339) finds for quarterly U.S. data
from 1954 to 1978 that unexpected movements in privately-held federal debt do
not raise the nominal yield on government securities of various maturities.
In fact, there is a weak tendency for yields to decline with innovations in
federal debt. Plosser's (1987, tables VIII and XI) later study, which
includes data through 1985, reaches similar conclusions for nominal and
expected real yields. Paul Evans (1987b) obtains similar results for nominal
yields with quarterly data from 1974 to 1985 for Canada, France, Cermany,
Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.21
Evans(1987a, Tables 4-6) finds for annual U.S. data from 1931 to 1979
that current and past real federal deficits have no significant association
with nominal interest rates on commercial paper or corporate bonds, or with
realized real interest rates on commercial paper. Over the longer period
from 1908 to 1984, using monthly data, there is some indication of a negative
relation between deficits and nominal or real interest rates (Evans, 1987a,
Tables 1-3). Evans also explores the effects of expected future budget
deficits or surpluses.lie assumes that people would have expected future
deficits in advance of tax cuts, such as in 1981, and future surpluses in
advance of tax hikes. Rut interest rates turn out typically not to rise in
advance of tax cuts and not to fall in advance of tax hikes. If anything,
interest rates tended to move with the opposite pattern. Mankiw's (1987)
analysis, which views the nominal interest rate as a form of tax rate, is
consistent with these findings.
Overall, the empirical results on interest rates support the Ricardian
view. Given these findings it is remarkable that most macroeconomists remain
confident that budget deficits raise interest rates.
B. C.onsumDtion and Saving
Most empirical results on the interplay between budget deficits and
saving come from the estimated coefficients of fiscal variables in
consumption or saving functions. Examples of this work are Levis Kochin
(1974), J. Ernest Tanner (1979), Martin Feldstein (1982), Roger Kormendi
(1983), John Seater and Robert Mariano (1985), and Franco Modigliani and22
Arlie Sterling (1986). The majority of these (selected) studies finds that
fiscal policy has little effect on consumer demand, but Feldsteio and
Modigliani/Sterling reach opposite conclusions.
The consumption-function approach has also been used to assess the effect
of retirement programs under social security. When funded on a pay-as-you-go
basis, such programs are similar to budget deficits in terms of their
theoretical effects oo national saving. Feldstein (1974, 1977) initially
concluded that more generous social security programs depressed national
saving. This finding was contested in subsequent research—see, for example,
Barro (1978), Darby (1979), Louis Esposito (1978), Sterling (1977), Barro and
Glenn MacDonald (1979), and Dean Leimer and Selig Lesnoy (1982). Overall,
the evidence from the U.S. time series and from a cross-section of countries
fails to demonstrate a clear link between social security and natiooal
saving.
The empirical studies mentioned above rely on estimates of consumption
functions; an approach that involves well-known identification prohlems. For
example, the analysis does not deal satisfactorily with the simultaneity
among consumption, income, and real interest rates. Another difficulty
concerns the definitions of wealth and income; the inclusion of capital gains
has dramatic effects on measures of U.S. saving (see James Poterba and
Lawrence Summers, 1986, Appendix Table A-2). Other problems concern the
fiscal variahles that enter as regressors. These variables can play a
signaling role for future income or government expenditure, and this role
affects the interpretation of estimated coefficients. For example, if the23
government adjusts its budget deficits to smooth out tax rates, as suggested
before, then the current tax rate proxies for the expected long-run ratio of
government expenditure to income, which influences current consumption demand
(see Levis Kochin, Daniel Benjamin, and Mark Meador, 1985). Similarly, the
correlation of the deficit with recessions, wars, etc. ,affectsthe analysis.
Chris Carroll and Lawrence Summers (1987) compare private saving in the
United States and Canada. they note that the private saving rates were
similar in the two countrus until the early 1970s, but have since diverged;
for 1983-85 the Canadian rate was higher by about 6 percentage points. After
holding fixed some macroeconomic variables and aspects of the tax systems
that influence saving, the authors isolate a roughly one-to-one, positive
effect of government budget deficits on private saving. That is, as implied
by the Ricardian view, the relative values of net national saving in the
United States and Canada appeared to be invariant with the relative values of
the budget deficits. These results are particularly interesting because the
focus on relative performance in the United States and Canada holds constant
the many forces that have common influences on the two countries. It may he
that this procedure lessens the problems of identification that hamper most
studies of consumption functions.
Recent fiscal policy in Israel comes close to a natural experiment for
studying the interplay between budget deficits and saving.8 Figure 1 shows
the values from 1974 to 1987 for the gross national saving rate, the gross
private saving rate, and the gross public saving rate. (The underlying
variables were converted at effective exchange rates into U.S. dollars.)Note that in 1983 the gross national saving rate of 137. corresponded to a
private saving rate of 177. and a public saving rate of -47,. In 1984 the
dramatic rise in the budget deficit led to a public saving rate of -117.. (A
principal reason for the deficit was the adverse effect of the increase in
the inflation rate on the collection of real tax revenues.) For present
purposes, the interesting observation is that the private saving rate rose
from 177. to 267,, so that the national saving rate changed little; actually
rising from 137. to 15%. Then the stabilization program in 1985 eliminated
the budget deficit, along with most of the inflation, so that the public
saving rate increased from -117. in 1984 to 0 in 1985- 86 and -2% in 1987. The
private saving rate decreased dramatically at the same time—from 26% in 1984
to 197. in 1985 and 14% in 1986-87. Therefore, the national saviog rates were
relatively stable, going from 15% in 1984 to 18% in 1985, 147. in 1986. and
127. in 1987.
One episode cannot be decisive in verifying or refuting a theory. Rut
the recent Israeli experience on fiscal policy—driven mainly by exogenous
changes in policy, rather than as reactions to the economy—reveals the
roughly one-to-one offset between public and private saving that the
Ricardian view predicts. For detailed analysis of the longer time series
evidence for Tsrael see Leiderman and Razin (1988) and Meridor (1988).
C. Current-Account Deficits
Popular opinion attributes the large current-account deficits in the
United States since 1983 to the effects of budget deficits. There has not
been much careful analysis of this relationship, but the data reveal a23
positive association between the two deficits only if the experience since
1983 is included.
Figure 2 shows the values since t948 of the ratio of the total government
budget surplus (national accounts' version) to GNP (solid line) and the ratio
of net foreign investment to GM' (dotted line).9 Through 1982 there is no
association between these two variables (correlation =- .02).However,
including the data since 1983 raises the correlation to .37. In effect, the
15.8. data since World War II reveal a single incident—the period since
1983—when budget and current-account deficits have been high at the same
time. While this recent co-movement is interesting, it does not provide
strong support for the view that budget deficits cause current-account
deficits. It would be useful to investigate this relationship further,
possibly with data from other countries.
5. Concluding Observations
The Iticardian approach to budget deficits amounts to the statement that
the government's fiscal impact is summarized by the present value of its
expenditures. Given this present value, rearrangements of the timing of
taxes—as implied by budget deficits—have no first-order effect on the
economy. Second-order effects arise for various reasons, which include the
distorting effects of taxes, the uncertainties about individual incomes and
tax obligations, the imperfections of credit markets, and the finiteness of
life. To say that these effects are second order is not to say that they are
uninteresting; in fact, the analysis of differential taxation in the theory26
ofpublic finance is second order in the same sense. However, careful
analysis of these effects tends to deliver predictions about budget deficits
that differ from those of standard macroeconomic models.
I have argued that empirical findings tend mainly to support the
fticárdian viewpoint. However, these findings deal primarily with interest
rates and consumption/saving, and the results are sometimes inconclusive. It
would be useful to assemble additional evidence, especially in an
international context.
Although the majority of economists still lean toward standard
macroeconomic models of fiscal policy, it is remarkable how respectable the
Ricardian approach has become in the last decade. Most macroeconomists now
feel obligated to state the Ricardian position, even if they then go on to
argue that it is either theoretically or empirically in error. I predict
that this trend will continue and that the Ricardian approach will become the
benchmark model for assessing fiscal policy. This is not to say that most
analysts will embrace Ricardian equivalence and therefore conclude that
fiscal policy is irrelevant. But satisfactory analyses will feature explicit
modeling of elements that lead to departures from Ricardian equivalence, and
the predicted consequences of fiscal policies will flow directly from these
elements.27
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*professor of Economics, Harvard University, and Research Associate of
the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Rochester Center for
Economic Research. I am grateful for support of research from the National
Science Foundation -
1Thecalculations use the government's interest rate in each period to
calculate present values, and assume perfect foresight with respect to future
government expenditures and taxes. For further discussion see Ben McCallum
(1984) and Rohert Barro (1989).
2The term, Ricardian equivalence theorem, was introduced to
macroeconomists by James Buchanan (1976). After Gerald O!Driscoll (1977)
documented Ricardu's reservations about this result, some economists have
referred to the equivalence finding as being non-Ricardian. But, as far as I-
have been able to discover, David Ricardo (1951) was the first to articulate
this theory. Therefore, the attribution of the equivalence theorem to
Ricardo is appropriate even if he had doubts about some of the theorem's
assumptions. As to whether the presence of this idea in Ricardo's writings
is important for scientific progress, I would refer to Nathan Rosenberg's
(1976, p. 79) general views on innovations in the social sciences: "... what
often happens in economics is that, as concern mounts over a particular
problem ...anincreasing number of professionals commit their time and
energies to it. We then eventually realize that there were all sorts of
treatments of the subject in the earlier literature. ...Wethen proceed to
read much of our more sophisticated present-day undertanding back into the28
work of earlier writers whose analysis was inevitably more fragmentary and
incomplete than the later achievement. It was this retrospective view which
doubtless inspired Whitehead to say somewhere that everything of importance
bas been said before——but by someone who did not discover it.'
3Philippe Weil (1987) and Miles Kimball (1987) analyze conditions that
ensure an interior solution for intergenerational transfers. Douglas
Bernheim and Kyle Bagwell (1988) argue that difficulties arise if altruistic
transfers are pervasive. See Barro (1989) for a discussion of their
analysis.
4The assumption is the the real debt remains permanently higher by 81.
For some related calculations, see Merton Miller and Charles Upton (1974,
Chapter 8) and James Poterba and Lawrence Summers (1987, Section I).
5'rhese results follow if the effects on investment demand are small.
With adjustment costs, investment would tend to respond little to this kind
of temporary change in income taxes.
6The conditions for optimality, based on results from optimal taxation
theory, appear in David Aschauer and Jeremy Greenwood (1985). On the ootion
of tax smoothing, see AC. Pigou (1928, Chapter 6), Robert Barro (1979,
1986) ,andFinn Kydland and Edward Prescott (1980).
7A colleague of mine argues that a "normative" model should be defined as
a model that fits the data badly.
81 am grateful to Ed Offenbácher for calling my attention to the Israeli
experience. Because of the magnitude of the variations, the Israeli case is
more revealing than the "Reagan experiment" associated with the large U.S.
budget deficits from 1984 to 1986. The effect of the Reagan deficits on29
saving and investment is controversial.
9The data are quarterly, seasonally-adjusted values from Citibase The
results are similar if the federal surplus is used instead of the total
government surplus.30
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